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The concept of "property rights" plays a 
prominent role in economic theory. Economists 
have been studying how property rights emerged 
as a system of allocation, replacing regimes of 
open access and lack of legal order. Property 
rights are regularly viewed by economists as the 
primary policy tool to control the incentives to 
invest in new assets (e.g., in information) and to 
maintain existing assets (e.g., fisheries) when 
contracts are incomplete. Property rights are the 
endowments that individuals exchange in a mar- 
ket economy, the equity that investors trade in 
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financial markets. Property rights are a basic 
building block in economics. 
But what are property rights? While "assets" 
are physical, natural, things, the rights of individ- 
uals in the assets are an abstract legal creation. 
Economists usually focus on one aspect of the 
right in the asset: the right to control. Legal 
analysis of property rights, on the other hand, 
adds another aspect of the right in the asset: the 
privilege of an individual to invoke the state's 
enforcement powers to fend off encroachments 
by nonrightholders. A property right, then, is a 
"pair" that is defined by (1) the physical uses that 
the rightholder is entitled to make ("the entitle- 
ment") and (2) the particular enforcement tech- 
niques that the state accords the rightholder in 
the event that others are violating or threatening 
to violate the entitlement ("the protection"). 
Recognizing that property rights have this dual 
structure-"entitlement" and "protection"- 
opens up a rich array of possibilities for design- 
ing property rights. Society has to choose not 
only the identity of the rightholder, namely, to 
whom the "entitlement" ought to be assigned, 
but also how to protect property rights. In the 
past generation, legal scholars influenced by the 
law-and-economics school of thought have 
shown that the protection technique is as funda- 
mental to the assignment of property rights as 
the entitlement itself. A mini-field has developed 
studying the formal characteristics of different 
protection regimes. One of the most creative and 
prolific contributors to this movement, Ian Ayres 
of Yale Law School, has now assembled his con- 
tributions into an impressively rich theory titled 
Optional Law. 
The starting point for this book was defined 
over thirty years ago by Guido Calabresi and 
Douglas Melamed in one of modem law's most 
influential and intelligent articles. At a time when 
legal analysis was partitioned into rigid fields 
such as contract law (obligations created volun- 
tarily), tort law (involuntary obligations created 
by harming others), and property law (the catalog 
of rights to control assets), Calabresi and 
Melamed offered a new, general way to look at all 
legal rights. Focusing on the "protection" aspect, 
they coined the distinction between two types of 
protections, "property rules" versus "liability 
rules." An entitlement is protected by a property 
rule through deterring others from violating it 
(e.g., through injunctions, punitive damages, and 
even prison terms). Conversely, an entitlement is 
protected by liability rules through compensating 
the entitlement holder when a violation occurs. 
To illustrate, consider a right formed by contract 
(say, the right of a buyer to receive from the sell- 
er the parcel of land which the buyer bought). 
This contractual right is the "entitlement" por- 
tion, but how is it protected when the seller 
breaches and refuses to make the promised trans- 
fer? Under a "property rule" regime, the buyer 
can invoke remedies that deter the seller from 
breaching the contract (e.g., large punitive dam- 
ages; or a court order mandating performance, 
enforced by the threat to place the seller in jail or 
pay large fines if he defies the order). Under a 
"liability rule" regime, the buyer can invoke 
remedies that compensate her for the monetary 
loss arising from nonperformance of the promise 
(e.g., damages equal to the buyer's valuation of 
the parcel of land-what contract law calls 
"expectation damages"). 
Calabresi and Melamed did not only introduce 
this distinction between the two types of protec- 
tions, they also offered a fundamental insight as 
to when the law should accord one type of pro- 
tection versus another. Property rules make 
sense, they claimed, when transactions costs are 
low. Since they deter potential violators from 
committing unilateral breaches and force them to 
reach consensual transactions, efficient alloca- 
tions would be assured (this, recall, is the Coase 
Theorem.) But when transaction costs are high 
and consensual transactions do not occur, liabili- 
ty rules become the efficient mode of protection. 
An outsider who wants to acquire the entitlement 
from the legal rightholder need not spend (or be 
discouraged by) the high transactions costs of a 
voluntary deal, but may rather take the entitle- 
ment unilaterally and pay the legally set damages 
to the rightholder. A liability rule regime attaches 
a price to the asset and grants outsiders the 
power-the option-to take the asset if they pay 
this price. 
Viewing the protection component of a liability 
rule as a call option-the option for any potential 
infringer to take the entitlement if it pays the 
exercise price of the legally fixed damages- 
opened a fertile ground for research. For one, if 
the protection component is an option, it need 
not be restricted to call options, but can be 
expanded and include put options. Whereas the 
call option liability rule grants the option holder 
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the right to take the asset for a fixed damages 
sum, the put option liability rule would grant the 
owner of the asset the right to force a sale and be 
paid a fixed sum for surrendering the asset. She 
need not secure the agreement of the transferee; 
she may even target an unwilling beneficiary, 
forcing him to accept the asset and to pay the 
nonnegotiated sum. 
Enter Ian Ayres. Put options, he noticed, do not 
exhaust the possibilities afforded by option theory 
for the design of the protection component of 
property rights. In a barrage of creativity, Ayres 
invents a host of new options to be attached to 
entitlements. Consider one example, a "Dual- 
Chooser" option. If Jack has an entitlement and 
Jill has a call option to take Jack's asset and pay the 
legally fixed damages, why not grant Jack a recip- 
rocal call option to take his asset back? In fact, 
once we open the door for such sequential 
options, many versions can be considered. Under 
one version of the dual option scheme, Jack would 
merely have to pay the same exercise price Jill had 
to pay to reacquire his asset. Ayres calls this rule 
the "single-price" dual-chooser rule. Under a 
more sophisticated version, the option prices are 
escalated. Jill may take Jack's asset for the price of 
pi; Jack may take his asset back but for a different 
price, P2, potentially higher than pi. In fact, why 
have only two rounds with two prices? 
Theoretically, Jack and Jill can keep taking the 
asset from each other, with the price increasing 
per round, until one drops out. Such higher order 
sequential options are the equivalent of an auc- 
tion mechanism, and as an auction "surrogate" 
they have the potential of allocating the asset in a 
more nuanced way toward its highest valuing 
party. 
But recognizing (or inventing) new platforms 
for legal allocations of assets is only the starting 
point for the analysis in Optional Law. The basic 
normative question remains: what benefit society 
gains by these option schemes? When should the 
law allow a party to take another's asset for a 
price? And when should it do the reverse, and 
allow the asset owner to force another party to 
take the asset and to pay for it, without first 
securing consent. Is there any social value in 
dual-chooser rules? 
If assets are to flow to their most efficient val- 
uers, it may appear at first blush that society 
would need a great deal of information to assign 
the entitlements efficiently. If the value that 
individuals assign to assets is often private infor- 
mation, courts cannot simply measure the com- 
peting valuations. Moreover, with asymmetric 
information, parties competing for the use of an 
asset may not always succeed in consensually 
agreeing on the efficient allocation. The trick, 
then, is to design a legal mechanism that would 
implement efficient allocations. Options, Ayres 
shows, "harness" individuals' private informa- 
tion. They induce the option holders to act in 
accordance with their information, thus reveal 
whether they are the highest valuers. 
Consider a simple example: Jack, the owner of 
an asset, values it at $50. Jill, a potential taker, 
has a valuation that, while known only to her, is 
known to lie uniformly on a continuum between 
0 and $100. In the presence of high transactions 
costs, Jack and Jill are not certain to succeed in 
agreeing on a sale of the asset to Jill whenever 
she values it more than $50. But if Jill is granted 
a call option to take Jack's asset for $50, she will 
do so only when it is efficient for her to acquire 
the asset. Courts do not need to verify Jill's valu- 
ation: the call option "harnesses" Jill's private 
information to the social enterprise of allocating 
the entitlement efficiently. 
Similarly, put options can be useful when it is 
the asset owner that has the private information. 
In the same example, let us assume that Jack, the 
owner, is the party with private information, 
whose value is only known to be distributed uni- 
formly between 0 and $100, whereas Jill, the 
potential taker, is known to have a certain value of 
$50. If Jack is granted a put option to sell the asset 
to Jill for $50, again he will do so only when it is 
efficient. The option, Ayres concludes, ought to 
be assigned to the party who has private informa- 
tion. If both parties have private information 
about their valuation of the asset, a single-option 
scheme would assign the option to the one with 
"more" private information, that is, the one whose 
distribution is known to have a larger variance. 
Even better, both parties' private information 
can be "harnessed" under the scheme of dual- 
chooser, described above. This would create an 
improvement whenever the parties' distributions 
have different means, but relatively similar vari- 
ances. If, say, Jack, the owner, is known to value 
the asset between 0 and $100 and Jill, the poten- 
tial taker, is known to value the asset between 20 
and 120, a simple improvement can be obtained 
by double-call options. Jill would exercise her call 
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option whenever her value exceeds the exercise 
price (say, $50, Jack's average value); Jack will 
counter by exercising his reverse call option and 
regaining ownership of the asset when his own 
valuation also exceeds this same, or a potentially 
higher ($60), strike price. 
In fact, even if both parties are known to have 
identical distributions, an improvement can be 
gained under the dual-option scheme if the 
prices under the two call options are "escalated." 
Ayres develops the formula for the optimal 
sequential options. For example, in the case in 
which both parties' distribution of value is uni- 
form between 0 and 100, an ideal dual option 
scheme would entitle Jill to take the asset for a 
price of $44.44, and for Jack to take it back for a 
price of $66.67. Interestingly, notice that Jill 
might decide to exercise her option even when 
her valuation is less than $44.44 in the hope that 
Jack will buy the asset back and leave her with a 
net gain. But the critical point is that, with esca- 
lating prices, the asset is allocated to the higher 
valuer more often. Effectively, one might say, the 
asset is auctioned to the competing bidders, with 
the proceeds of the sale cleverly divided between 
the parties. 
One of the most impressive accomplishments 
of Ayres theory is the surgical precision with 
which he isolates efficiency concerns from wealth 
distribution and gives each a thorough examina- 
tion. Ayres is writing against a tradition of law- 
and-economics that is at times agnostic with 
respect to distributive concerns (and focuses 
solely on allocative efficiency). He is also writing 
against a tradition of mainstream legal scholar- 
ship that, while concerned primarily with fairness 
and redistribution, lacks the rigorous tools to 
determine analytically how legal rules redistrib- 
ute wealth. So while his theory prescribes the 
allocations of puts and calls according to the effi- 
ciency-minded "information harnessing" criteri- 
on, he recognizes that such rules can be fine 
tuned to achieve any ex post distribution that pol- 
icymakers desire. Go back to Jack and Jill: if we 
think that granting Jill a $50 call option on Jack's 
asset unfairly accords Jill the entire surplus, there 
is a simple solution. Jill can be required to pay 
Jack some money irrespective of whether she 
exercises the option. If she does not exercise the 
option, she will have pay Po; if she does, she will 
have to pay Po + $50. This "Pay or Pay" scheme 
allows society to achieve any redistribution from 
Jill to Jack (and vice versa, ifpo < 0), and by main- 
taining the $50 gap between Jill's two strategies, 
it is guaranteed that she will exercise the option 
only when the value of the asset to her exceeds 
$50. Courts, Ayres shows, can maximize the ex 
post surplus and at the same time preserve their 
"unfettered control" to divide it as they like. 
Hence, piece by piece Ayres demonstrates how 
options can be designed to govern the "protection" 
element of property rights. With all the pieces in 
place, a striking claim emerges: ownership of 
assets need not be protected by property rules, but 
rather by liability rules. An owner of an asset 
should not be entitled to prevent or deter others 
from taking her asset, nor should the state punish 
or try to prevent nonconsensual takings. All that 
the owner should be getting in terms of protec- 
tion, and all the state will help her achieve, is the 
payment of a court-set sum of damages after the 
asset is taken from her, and potentially be accord- 
ed a reciprocal option to reacquire her asset. Even 
more far-reaching, an owner of an asset who wants 
to sell it need not secure the agreement of a poten- 
tial buyer. Instead, he could have a put option and 
dump the asset upon a nonconsensual recipient, 
again, for a price set by law, and perhaps subject to 
the recipient's reverse option to counterdump the 
asset (potentially, though, for a lower price). 
An important claim that Ayres makes with full 
force throughout the book concerns the superiori- 
ty of the nonconsensual transfer mechanism and 
the fact that this superiority is maintained even 
when bargaining is possible and transactions costs 
are low. One would think-and law-and-econom- 
ics writers have repeatedly argued-that with low 
costs of trade, the market-oriented consensual 
transfer system would be preferable to a court- 
mandated scheme, at the very least due to the sav- 
ing of legal costs. But Ayres shows otherwise. With 
low transactions costs, he argues, an individual 
who is anxious about options being exercised 
against her (say, concerned that her asset will be 
taken for some price) can "bribe" the holder of the 
option and purchase a release from the option. 
And if she is concerned that the legally set price is 
too high so that there will be no takers, she can 
again get around it by offering a lower consensual 
price. Low transactions costs smooth the operation 
of crude options/liability rules just as well as they 
facilitate Coasian transfers under a system that for- 
bids nonconsensual takings. But-and this is the 
punch line-even with low transactions costs, 
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asymmetric information may prevent efficient bar- 
gains from being struck. It is here that the system 
of options has the advantage over "unstructured 
bargaining" by setting "clear choices and structure 
responses" that harness private information. 
0 0 0 
There you have it, "Optional Law"-a legal 
order of options that redesigns the baseline for 
the transfer of assets in society. To many, lawyers 
and nonlawyers alike, this scheme may sound rev- 
olutionary, putting more faith in courts and the 
legal system to regulate exchange than in market 
transactions, thus turning on its head the institu- 
tion of property rights. But the case Ayres makes 
for Optional Law cannot be dismissed merely on 
the ground that it is so unorthodox. For one, 
Ayres is well aware that his theory may "prove too 
much" and that factors mitigating its applicability 
ought to be explored. Furthermore, throughout 
the book Ayres uncovers many examples that 
demonstrate how the law already applies variants 
of his option scheme in protecting entitlements. 
The most powerful example, of course, is the pro- 
tection of contractual rights. Anglo-American law 
allows a party to a contract to breach the contract 
unilaterally-that is, to "take" the contractual 
right of the counterparty-and pay damages. 
Contracts, then, are a species of entitlement that 
is already subject to call options. Ayres goes 
beyond this obvious example and shows that in 
many other areas of the law, some quite esoteric 
but others more central, rights and entitlements 
can be taken or conferred nonconsensually, 
subject to legally mandated exercise prices. 
But the fact the legal system occasionally sam- 
ples the Optional Law scheme is still a long way 
from the claim that it ought to be reformed to 
conform to Ayres's vision of options throughout. 
Even if classroom experiments or numerical sim- 
ulations demonstrate that entitlements subject to 
call and put options lead to superior bargaining 
results, it is doubtful whether this book can truly 
settle the debate and declare the victory of liabil- 
ity rules, and prove the inexistence of a theory 
that can support a regime of consensual transac- 
tions. On a technical level, many of the intuitions 
fleshed out by Ayres are demonstrated in restric- 
tive environments of incomplete information, 
where the distribution of values is assumed to be 
uniform. Other writers have shown that for more 
general distributions of value it would be difficult 
to generate legally workable formulae of option 
prices. But my critique here does not build on 
any alleged technical shortfalls of the theory; in 
fact, this theory is at least as sound technically as 
much of the law and economics models that pre- 
ceded it. Rather, in the remaining space I wish to 
sketch one direction that a substantive critique of 
Ayres's theory of options can take. 
One of the basic ingredients of Optional Law is 
the put option-the possibility of granting the 
owner of an asset the option to force another to 
buy the asset for a court-set fixed sum, even if the 
other is not interested in making a consensual 
purchase. Put options, recall, are necessary 
because the "harnessing" insight requires that in 
an important set of cases, entitlements be 
assigned to "optimal chooser"-the person with 
the greatest variance of values--even if she is 
known to have a lower mean. The lower mean 
problem is resolved by granting the assigned 
owner a put option. Thus, this theory builds on the 
symmetry between put and call options ("deep 
similarities," as Ayres refers to it), maintaining the 
absence of an a priori reason to prefer one type 
over the other. But the overwhelming tradition of 
the legal system denies this symmetry. While call 
options are quite abundant (damage rules for con- 
tract breach, compulsory licenses of patents, and 
the right of factories to create compensated nui- 
sances are some prominent examples), put options 
are strikingly rare. Ayres finds a neat example here 
and there, but that only works to emphasize that it 
takes Ayresian ingenuity to notice their existence, 
for otherwise put options are too bizarre and 
obscure. Even he recognizes that their incidence 
is lower than that of call options. 
For many legal scholars, this descriptive obser- 
vation about the rarity of put options in the law 
would suffice in disproving Ayres's theory. They 
would conclude that there must be some underly- 
ing reason, not recognized by Ayres, that under- 
mines the validity of his thesis, or else why would 
the law squander centuries of opportunity to "get 
it right"? Why does the law generally prohibit put 
options and why is it fairly stingy in allowing call 
options? My argument, though, is not based on 
"revealed preference" by the law, but more con- 
cretely on the existence of a competing efficiency 
perspective, focusing on the ex ante behavior of 
parties. Put options, we might worry, subject peo- 
ple to disruption of their freedom to "be left 
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alone." If you are not interested in owning my 
Chevy and if you never made any gesture that 
would have led me to believe you might be a will- 
ing buyer, you would hate to find my Chevy parked 
in your lot, coupled with a legally backed obliga- 
tion on your part to pay for it, however reasonable 
the price might be. True, there is an allocative ffi- 
ciency argument that cannot be denied: "on aver- 
age," you may be a more efficient user of the 
Chevy than me, especially if I privately know that 
I truly don't need the car any more. It may even be 
possible to prove that you value my car. But you 
may be reluctant, perhaps because you prefer to 
shop around for an even better vehicle. My ability 
to force unwilling parties like you to pay for my car 
gives me ample opportunity to extort the likes of 
you, folks who would be willing to pay some money 
to be free from the disruption that my put option 
imposes. Thus, a way to truly flourish in Ayres's 
economy is to invest in opportunities to extort: to 
identify all those parties who, while they objective- 
ly benefit from the asset (and are thus subject to 
the put option), they truly do not want the asset. 
Having identified such targets, an owner can 
threaten to exercise the option, and be paid off. 
To gain a more concrete grip on the danger 
underlying Ayres's put option scheme, think of all 
the unsolicited emails individuals receive daily, all 
the junk mail offers and phone solicitations, mar- 
keting this product or that. In the existing regime, 
sellers need to secure the assent of their targeted 
buyers. Indeed, these pestering communications 
represent sellers' effort to convince skeptical buy- 
ers to say yes. But if sellers had put options-if 
they were allowed to deliver the product without 
the buyers' saying yes and charge the buyers the 
legally set price-individuals' freedom to be left 
alone would be seriously disrupted. Even if the 
recipients would have a reciprocal option, name- 
ly, the right to return the goods and be relieved 
from the duty to pay, they would have to con- 
stantly be on guard to avoid getting stuck with 
unwanted benefits. Individuals may find it worthy 
to "bribe" sellers to take them off the marketing 
list. And with the growing potential to stick buyers 
with unwanted products or to extract "bribes," 
sellers would have greater incentive ex ante to 
enter the business of offering unwanted benefits. 
The fact that regulators and courts have devised 
rules that intend to protect consumers from such 
situations suggests that the problem of unwanted 
benefits may be a serious one. 
Ayres is not oblivious to this risk, and at times 
admits that the options he advocates should not 
be operative between "strangers." But he does 
not provide a theoretical yardstick to limit the 
scope of his theory, and occasionally follows the 
natural conclusion that the theory has unlimited 
scope-that the option scheme ought to govern 
all allocations. 
In the end, Ayres can be commended for rec- 
ognizing that entitlements can be coupled with 
more than one type of option-that there are 
numerous dimensions that can be manipulated in 
designing the options. His analytical achievement 
is significant in showing so cleanly how these 
options can be designed to elicit private informa- 
tion without sacrificing distributive concerns. But 
one may worry that some of these "dizzying array 
of options," as Ayres calls them, would in fact 
create a dizzying array of opportunities to pester 
individuals into deals they do not want, to take 
from individuals assets that they do not wish to 
sell, and to force individuals to spend time and 
money defending against these risks. True, one- 
sided options can overcome failures of consensu- 
al transactions that are due to asymmetric 
information. But an exchange economy in which 
individuals have the right to determine whether 
to enter into a transaction, while perhaps sacrific- 
ing some allocative efficiency, may have other ex- 
ante benefits that dwarf the incremental ex-post 
improvement of the option scheme. 
Ayres's theory is indeed brilliant and intriguing, 
certain to become a benchmark in many debates. 
It provides new understandings for some existing 
legal traditions and it may even have the power to 
prescribe some new legal rules. But this reader, 
for one, remains skeptical whether the theory has 
a significant domain of applicability. 
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR 
Professor of Law and Economics 
University of Michigan Law School 
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